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Fred and Fran Fortune, a prudent, elderly couple, each of whom has
substantial wealth, wish to devise an estate plan. Will intervivos trusts
fit into this plan? If their objectives will be served, intervivos trusts,
properly conceived, will certainly save estate taxes and administration
expenses. One device, however, the reciprocal trust arrangement, should
be treated with great caution.
Assume, for example, that Fred wishes to distribute his wealth,
or part of it, to their children and grandchildren and at the same time
provide a life income for Fran. Fran also desires that her property should
go to the offspring. However, she feels that Fred's guidance may be necessary sometime in the future, and she would like to have this property
subject to his control, at least indirectly. Both are concerned about anticipated estate taxes.
Their attorney might conclude that irrevocable intervivos reciprocal
trusts would provide the perfect solution to accomplish all of these objectives. Under such an arrangement, Fred would execute a trust naming
Fran as life income beneficiary and the children as remaindermen. Fran
would create a trust naming the children as sole beneficiaries, but giving
Fred a power to alter or terminate the trust in favor of the beneficiaries
should he see fit.
On its face, this scheme appears desirable as favoring the expressed
objects of Fred and Fran's bounty. It also seemingly accomplishes the
end that the property Fred and Fran transfer in trust will not be taxed
in their respective estates. Neither grantor retains a power over the trust
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property transferred which would subject it to estate tax under sections
2036-38 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
Their attorney, however, would be ill-advised in his conclusions.
This reciprocal trust arrangement would bear no beneficial estate tax
consequences. Fred's estate would be taxed for the value of property
which Fran transferred and over which Fred had the power to alter or
terminate. Fran's estate would be subjected to tax on the value of Fred's
transfer in which she was the life income beneficiary. Similar results
would occur wherever Fred and Fran Fortune, or any two parties, execute intervivos trusts that vest in each other any power which, if reserved
in the grantor, would subject his estate to a tax under sections 2036-38.1
Why should the estate tax law be interpreted in such a manner as
to levy a tax on the estate of Fred Fortune because he holds a power to
alter or terminate ittrust when the code provides only that Fran's estate
will be subject to tax if she retains this power?" Likewise, Fran, not Fred,
is the life income beneficiary of Fred's trust. The code states only that
Fred's estate will be taxed if he reserves a life estate.' Nowhere is it provided that an income beneficiary's estate is taxed on the value of the
trust corpus of which he is the beneficiary.
The answer, in brief, is that Fred is in the same position as a result
of the two trusts as he would have been had he, in his own transfer,
reserved the power to alter or terminate. On the other hand, Fran's
future would be just as secure as if she had reserved a life estate in the
trust which she created. In view of these results, why should sections
2036-38 ' of the estate tax law not apply?
STATUTORY BACKGROUND

From the inception of the federal estate tax, it was apparent that
Congress intended to tax in a decedent's estate not only property transferred on the death of the decedent, but also those intervivos transfers
over which the deceased transferor has retained certain powers still in
effect at his death. In the early acts, Congress levied only on the value
of the powers retained over transferred property by the deceased transferorY In later laws, hGwever, the retention of taxable powers, under most
circumstances, has subjected the entire value of the property transferred
7
to taxation in the deceased transferor's estate.
These provisions have required imposing an estate tax on property
which the deceased did not own at death, but from which, due to the
existence of certain powers, substantial economic benefits could or did
accrue to him during his lifetime. These powes aire enumerated in secI Int. Rev. Code of 1954. In substance, the transferor's estate is taxed on the value
of all property transferred by trust or otherwise where: (a) The transferor retains
a life estate, income for life, or right to designate beneficiaries. 3d. § 2036. (b) Possession or enjoyment of the property can, through ownership, be obtained only by
surviving the decedent and the decedent has retained a reversionary interest of 5%
of the value of such property. Id. § 2037. (c) Enjoyment of the property was subject
at decedent's death to a power in himself alone or in conjunction with any other
person to alter, amend, revoke or terminate such transfer. Id. § 2038.
2 Id. § 2036-38.
3 Id. § 2038.
4 Id. § 2036.
51d. §§ 2036-38.
6 Rev. Act. of 1926, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 71 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2038).
This subsection required inclusion in the gross estate of property to the extent of
any interest therein, which the decedent transferred during his life, by trust or
otherwise, where the enjoyment thereof was subject at his date of death to any change
through the exercise of a power, either by decedent alone or in conjunction with any
person, to alter, amend or revoke . .. except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth.
7 These changes in the law were first made in 1932. 47 Stat. 279.
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tions 2036-38 and 2041 of the present code.' Congress has never taxed
the value of property over which such powers have been retained to the
extent that the transfer was a "bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth." 9 The theory is that the transferor's estate can in such cases be taxed on the consideration received. 10
THE LEHMAN CASE

Taxpayers and their attorneys earl), moved to take advantage of
broad statutory language concerning powers which would subject transferred property to an estate tax in the estate of the transferor. The
countermove by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue resulted in the
1
case of Lehman v. Commissioner,"
still the leading authority in the field.
The Lehman brothers owned equal shares in stocks and bonds. in 1930
each brother agreed to transfer his share of the securities in trust for the
other and the latter's issue, in consideration of a similar transfer by the
other. They simultaneously executed trust instruments with reciprocal
provisions. Under each, the benefited brother was to receive the income
for life, remainder to his issue, and the life income beneficiary had the
power to withdraw $150,000 from trust corpus. The decedent had never
exercised this power to withdraw.
The executor of the decedent brother's estate did not include any
of the property involved in either trust in the gross estate. The Commissioner determined that $150,000 should have been included in the
gross estate as the amount over which the decedent held the power to
withdraw."
That this particular case presented a tax avoidance scheme was selfevident and the facility with which it could be employed no doubt
alarmed the Commissioner. It cannot be assumed that trusts with reciprocal provisions executed by relatives were invented to avoid taxes. Certainly they existed before the estate tax was conceived. Nevertheless,
the Commissioner was charged with the integrity of tax administration,
and with the tailor-made situation in the Lehman trusts at hand, the
controversy was litigated.
In this case of Lehman v. Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals"
and held that the Commissioner's determination had been correct. The
court grounded its finding on a "well established principle" found in
Professor Scott's treatise on trusts, to the effect that, "A person who furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor, even
though in form the trust is created by another person.'"
As a result of this principle, the court said, the fact that the trusts
were reciprocated or crossed was a mere trifle. If X furnishes consideration in return for the creation of a trust by Y, with X being named a
beneficiary, this results in X's becoming the real settlor. Here each trust
Slut. Rev. Code of 1954. §§ 2036-38 and 2041.
9Id. §§ 2036-38.
10 Colgan and Malloy, Converse Trusts-The
Device, 3 Tax L. Rev. 271 (1948).

lise and Fall of a Tax Avoidance

112 Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.), cert. deinied, 310 U.S. 637 (1940).

' Rev. Act. of 1926, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 71, which governed this trust, did not
require the entire property transferred to be taxed where a power to alter or amend
was reserved, but only the portion of the property subject to the power. The Revenue
Act contained no provision for retained life income.
13 Estate of Harold M. Lehman, 39 ]B.T.A. 17 (1939).
14 1 Scott, Trusts § 156.3 (1st ed. 1939).
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was created in consideration of the other trust so that the life beneficiary of each was actually the settlor. The court declared that there
was a transfer involved and that when the settlors were properly uncrossed they had reserved the power which Congress had declared taxable. The court therefore concluded that the decedent Lehman brother
had derived from the reciprocal trusts exactly the economic relationship
to specified property that he would have retained had he transferred
the same property in trust. Since this power would have been taxable
had he been the settlor, and because Professor Scott's principle classifies
him as the settlor, the decedent brother was taxed as the settlor of the
trust created by his brother. Consequently, because the decedent brother
had a power to alter, his estate was taxed on $150,000, the amount subject to this power.
ANALYSIS OF

ALTERNATIVES

AVAILABLE TO THE LEHMAN COURT

It is submitted that there were at least four methods by which the
court could have decided the Lehman case. First, it could have reversed
the Commissioner's determination on the ground that the language of
the statute did not cover the type of situation presented by trusts in
consideration of one another. However, the court felt that the intent of
Congress to tax reserved powers had been violated, it could not permit
such an arrangement to go untaxed in view of the resulting economic
positions of the parties involved.
That taxation of an economic condition resulting from a transfer
in trust can be adequately covered by Congress is illustrated by sections
671-78 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which collectively are
entitled, "Grantors and Others Treated as Substantial Owners." These
code provisions are indeed an outgrowth of the doctrine pronounced
in the Clifford case'" which was decided just one month after the Lehman
case.
A second possible method of disposing of the issue raised by the
Lehman situation would have been to employ the language in each of
the "reserved power" code provisions that reservation of the power would
not subject the property transferred to an estate tax where the transfer
was a bona fide sale for an adeqLuate and full consideration in money
15

Helvering

v.

Clifford.

309

U.S,

331

(1940).

It

is

interesting

to note

that the

reciprocal trust situation has never been treated by statute nor even illustrated in the
estate tax regulations.
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or money's worth."' This would have absolved the decedent Lehman
brother of any tax liability arising out of the trust arrangement because
the fact that the transfers were for full consideraton had been stipulated. The equities demanded rejection of this course of action.
The third, and, the author submits the best, possible countermove
which the Government might have made to the Lehman type arrangement, would have involved casting aside all incidents of the form of
transfer. The court could then have characterized the matter strictly
from substantive results as was clone in the Clifford case. The Lehman
court appeared willing to interpret broadly congressional intent as desiring to tax an economic condition resulting from transfers with certain
designated powers reserved, or the economic equivalents of such transfers. It should therefore have been willing to say that the equivalent
transactions would be taxed regardless of the legal device employed.
In the long run this would have eliminated much confusion. The taxpayers and their counselors then would have had only to concern themselves with the substantive results of their transfers in trust, rather than,
in addition, the contracts doctrine of consideration.
The fourth approach to the reciprocal trust arrangement, the one
chosen by the Lehman and all succeeding courts, utilizes the concept of
consideration and is based on Professor Scott's principle discussed
above.' 7 Prior to the Lehman case the reciprocal trust doctrine had twice
been urged and rejected in the courts.s In view of this the Lehman
estate undoubtedly felt that its safest defense was to plead adequate and
full consideration, thereby at least prevailing under the code language
that a bona fide sale for adequate and full consideration would relieve
the property transferred from estate taxation."
DEVELOPMENT

OF THE CONSIDERATION

DOCTRINE

The Lehman estate stipulated that the transfers in trust between
the brothers were in consideration of one another. This aided the Lehman
court in avoiding a pitfall that a New Jersey court had encountered
previously when it held that transfers similar to those of the Lehman
brothers had actually been illusory.'" The New Jersey court found there
had been no transfer in a tax sense, and the property involved escaped
taxation under statutory language which taxed "property transferred"
in the transferor's estate.
In Lehman, the transfer and consideration both having been stipulated, the court merely cited the doctrine that a person who furnishes
the consideration for the creation of a trust is the settlor, even though
in form the trust is created by another person. Once the court had indicated its acceptance of this theory it had no trouble showing the validity
of the result in light of the facts in the case. Both brothers had retained
the same attorneys, employed exactly the same language and substantive
provisions in their respective trust instruments and had transferred property of equivalent value. Each brother, as trust beneficiary, had held
the same powers over the property transferred. In short, the facts showed
16Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 2036-38.
17 1 Scott, Trusts 785 (1st ed. 1939).
18Phillips v. Gnichtel, 27 F.2d 662 (3d Cir.), cert.
Estate of Margaret A. Holmes, 27 B.T.A. 660 (1933).
19 Rev. Act of 1926, § 302(d), 44 Stat. 71.
20 In re Perry, 111 N.J. Eq. 176, 162 Atl. 146 (1932).

denied,

278

U.S.

636

(1928);
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complete interdependence of action and precluded any other than a tax
scheme as the apparent motivtion.
A brief word might here be mentioned concerning the "well established principle" of trusts on which the Lehman court based its adoption
of the reciprocal trust theory in the field of estate taxation. This principle is stated in Professor Scott's treatise under the section relating to
spendthrift trusts. It establishes that X cannot isolate himself from
claims of creditors by giving consideration to Y in return for Y's creating
a spendthrift trust with X as beneficiary.2' In support of this "well established principle," Professor Scott cited only one decision, a California
case. 2 " As will be demonstrated, the concept is undoubtedly of more
utility in the field of spendthrift trusts than in estate taxation.
The key word in the reciprocal trust theory as employed by the
courts in estate tax cases is consideration. This is what made the Lehman
facts the landmark case for the application of the doctrine, viz. it was
both stipulated and apparent from the facts that the brothers had bargained for and received a quid pro quo in return for their respective
transfers in trust.
In every case since Lehman where the doctrine has been applied,
this fact of consideration has been illusive and disputed. Since the taxability of.trust property in the reciprocal trust situation depends on a
finding of consideration, this issue has been the turning point of each
controversy. Consequently, whether a legal device has prevailed over
what is essentially a taxable economic condition has been made to depend upon the interpretation and application of the legal term consideration.
An example of the problems the courts encounter in basing their
decisions on consideration may be found in the fact of bargaining which,
in some form, is an essential element of the contracts doctrine of' consideration."8 Imagine the difficulty, at least where one party to the transfers is dead and there is no recitation of consideration in the instruments,
of showing by objective evidence that bargaining preceded the creation
of two trusts with reciprocal provisions. Obviously, the courts have had
to devise many presumptions to accommodate this situation.
No matter how tenuous the fact of consideration in any given case,
every court since the Lehman decision has felt compelled to base application of the reciprocal trusts theory on a finding of consideraion. This
finding, in turn, has become essential to the Commissioner's determination that the reciprocal trusts situation exists and that the estate of a
party holding one of the taxable powers should be taxed on the value
of the property in trust.
In view of the presumption accorded the Commissioner in most
courts, few arrangements objectionable from a tax view point have been
passed over for want of a finding of consideration. On the other hand,
the conclusiveness of the finding on consideration as employed under
the benefit of the Commissioner's presumption has been said to work
21 1 Scott, Trusts, 785-86 (1st ed. 1939).
22 McColgan v. Walter Magee, Inc., 172 Cal. 182, 155 Pac. 995 (1916). Scott cites
the Lehman and succeeding estate tax cases in support of the principle that, 'Where
one person creates a trust for another in consideration of the other's creating a
similar trust for him, each is in substance creating a trust for himself." 2 Scott,
Trusts 1103 (2d ed. 1956).
23 Restatement, Contracts § 75 (1932): Consideration for a promise is an act ..or a return promise bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.
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an inequity on many arrangements in which tax 2 avoidance
or objection4
able economic positions play little if any part.
CASE LAW SINCE LEHMAN

The issue never having been specifically decided by the United
States Supreme Court, one must look to the various circuits and to the
Tax Court for the authoritative case law on reciprocal trusts. It is somewhat incongruous that the doctrine has been applied almost solely to close
relatives, e.g., husband and wife, parent and child or brother and sister.
This kinship ordinarily connotes the natural object of one's bounty.
It would seem that these are the very persons who would make transfers
in trust providing for each other's welfare without requesting anything
in return, and that more often than not the reciprocating is out of love,
affection or other familial concern.2 5 However, the Commissioner and
most of the courts have seen fit to impute to the family relationship an
element of conduct giving rise to the inference of commercially interdependent action and reciprocity. Thus the prevailing view has developed that unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, the fact that
trusts are reciprocal between members of the family in itself shows the
necessary concert of action and tacit
agreement on a quid pro quo to
2

support a finding of consideration.. 1
If the presumption is this favorable towards the Commissioner,
obviously the element of bargain plays a minor role in the determination of consideration. The courts appear actually to have reached their
decisions on the basis of retention of effective economic control.
There are many shades of opinion in the courts relative to the presumption of consideration and the need for objective facts to support or
rebut its existence. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is at the
extreme of the legalistic approach to consideration. It will not infer
consideration if there is any evidence to the 7contrary. Proof of actual
consideration bargained for must be shown.2
The Third Circuit has recognized that its test is substantially different from those of the other circuits, but has suggested that it is for
Congress to declare another basis of taxability if it does not feel the

court's concept of consideration is correct." s In In re Lueder's Estate, 9
the court in effect shifted the presumption in favor of the taxpayer by
saying that the stipulation of facts concerning the decedent's trust created a prima facie case of gift and that it was up to the Commissioner
to rebut.
The view at the other extreme is held by the Second Circuit which
will, in accordance with the general view of the Tax Court, infer consideration from the terms of the trusts and circumstances surrounding
their creation unless evidence to the contrary is convincing." This court
finds it highly improbable that spouse H could create a trust for the
other's benefit unless induced to do so by a quid'pro quo provided by
spouse W's reciprocal transfer. The case of Orvis v. Higgins"' found
24 Orvis v. Higgins. 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.),
25 Note, 30 Notre Dame Law. 149 (1954).

cert. denied, 340 U.S.

810 (1950).

26 Johnson, Reciprocal Trusts-A Tax Avoidance Device With Recuperative Powers. 36 Neb. L. Rev. 564 (1957).
27 Newberry's Estate v. Commissioner. 201 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1953); In re Lueder's
Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
28 Note, 34 N.C. L. Rev. 560 (1956).
29 In re Lueder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
30 Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
31 Orvis v. Higgins, supra note 30.
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the Second Circuit reversing the Tax Court's determination of an absence of reciprocity based upon negative evidence that the grantors,
husband and wife, did not know of one another's intention. The Court
of Appeals said this (lid not rebut the clear inference that there must
have been concert of action.
Between these two extremes are a variety of discernible views regarding consideration. The Eighth Circuit will infer consideration
from the objective facts in the absence of evidence to the contrary.12
The Fifth and Seventh Circuits refuse to infer the existence of consideration unless supported by some evidence."3
What type of evidence or objective fact is persuasive in finding
consideration? Of course, recital of its existence in the instruments
would probably be conclusive. Direct testimony that such was intended
would be given equal weight. Unfortunately, only the Lehman case was
that simple and in no litigation since that time has the evidence been
so clearcut. The objective facts surrounding the creation of the trusts,
as well as reciprocal provisions in the instruments themselves, will generally support the finding that each settlor has given the other something of valuea
Some courts require proof of actual bargaining. 3 Others, depending
on the inference they attach to the familial relationship and the presence
of reciprocal provisions, require only that the facts show the parties,
or one of them, were motivated to act by the knowledge of each other's
transfer. Still other courts hold that a showing of awareness by the parties of each other's intentions will suffice to support consideration. The
most liberal courts will find the necessary bargaining solely from the
facts of close relationship, reciprocal provisions and any semblance of
simultaneous creation of instruments. Lack of evidence pertaining to
knowledge and motivation of the parties is no deterrent to these courts
unless positive evidence to the contrary appears. 6 When the presumption of consideration becomes this strong, any similarity to the legal
concept of consideration is strictly coincidental.
Factual events supporting the Commissioner's inference of reciprocity include prior agreement between the grantor," mutual planning,"s use of the same attorneys, advisers and trustees, 9 simultaneous
creation of trusts, and a relationship of mutual trust and confidence
between grantors 0 The exchange of similar powers, e.g., X gives Y a life
estate and Y gives X power to invade corpus, strongly supports reciprocity.
Where there have been reciprocal provisions in the instruments,
the decedent's estate has overcome the Commissioner's inference only
when the facts have indicated independent action by the settlors. For
example, evidence of failure of one spouse ever to mention to the other
her intention to create a trust was held to sustain the burden of proof
in establishing that the transfers were separate, independent and uncon32 Cole's Estate v. Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (Sth Cir. 1944).
38 Tobin v. Commissioner, 183 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1950): McLhain v. Jarecki, 232 F.2d
211 (7th Cir. 1956).
34 Comment, 42 Calif. L. Rev. 151 (1954).
35 See note 27 supra.
.46 Orvis v. Higgins. 10 F.2d 537 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
37 Blackman v. U.S., 48 F. Supp. 362 (Ct. Cl. 1943).
38 Estate of John H. Eckhardt, 5 T.C. 673 (1945).
39 Estate of Florence Moreno, 28 T.C. No. 98 (July 26, 1957); Estate of Grace D.
Sinclaire, 13 T.C. 742 (1949). But cf. In re Lueder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
40 Estate of Carrie S. Newberry, 6 T.C.M. 455 (1947), aff'd per curiam, 172 F.2d
220 (3d Cir. 1948).
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nected transfers. The court here did not find reciprocal trusts, even
though they were executed almost simultaneously and were similar in
provisions and amount of corpus. 1 Where the trusts were created fifteen
months apart, the Third Circuit held that there was no evidence to
indicate bargaining or that one trust was created in return for the promise to establish the later one. The court pointed out that under the
circumstances, the wife may have felt a moral obligation to return the
husband's transfer, but that a moral obligation was insufficient to constitute consideration.42 Lack of participation in each other's plans and
lack of prior agreement as to the creation or the provisions of the trusts
were held to be indicative of independent action and an absence of the
necessary exchange in another case."1 Here it was positively shown that
the motives of the grantors in creating the trusts were dissimilar.
The typical trust arrangement in which the Commissioner has attempted to employ the reciprocal trusts theory has concerned equivalent principal amounts. However, the existence of unequal trust corpora
has presented no obstacle. The decedent's estate sustains a tax on the
proportionate value of property transferred to the deceased as beneficiary.44
RECENT CASES

A peculiar situation arose in Estate of Carl J. Guenzel,4" decided in
the Tax Court in April 1957. There, a husband and wife created trusts
simultaneously in 1936. Each transfer in trust provided for life income
to the spouse, remainder to issue unless the grantor survived the benefited spouse. In this event the grantor would receive the income for .life,
the remainder to issue.
The wife died first, in 1947, and the Commissioner claimed that
she was the actual grantor of the trust set up by her husband under the
reciprocal trusts doctrine. Her estate conceded the point and was taxed
on the entire value of the property. The husband was then left with
income benefits both from the trust created by his wife and the one he
himself had set up. The husband in 1949 renounced all rights in the
trust created by his wife.
When the husband died in 1951, the Commissioner sought to
include in his estate not the trust created by the wife, over which the
husband would have been deemed grantor under the reciprocal trust
theory, but the trust he himself had created and which had been taxed
in his wife's estate. It is evident that the property in the trust created
by the wife could not have been reached in the husband's estate because
of the husband's renunciation of rights. It is also true, however, that the
nature of economic benefits which the husband held warranted taxation
of one trust or the other in his estate.
The Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determination that
41 Estate of Samuel Lindsay, 2 T.C. 174 (1943).
42 in re Lueder's Estate, 164 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1947).
A3 Estate of Louise D. Ruxton, 20 T.C. 487 (1953); Estate of Arnold Resch, 20 T.C.
171 (1953).

44 Estate of Carolyn P. Boardman, 20 T.C. 871 (1953). The estate of the decedent
beneficiary of the larger trust (the decedent being deemed the settlor of that trust

under the reciprocal

trusts doctrine) is taxed on that proportion of the date of death

value of the trust as the value of the smaller trust bears to the value of the larger
trust when originally created. The estate of the grantor of the smaller trust will, of

course, be taxed on the date of death value of that property. See Cole's Estate v.
Commissioner, 140 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1944) wherein the husband's trust consisted of
700 shares and the wife's trust of 300 shares of the same kind of stock.
45 Estate of Carl J. Guenzel, 28 T.C. No. 10 (April 17, 1957), appeal docketed,
8th Cir.
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the trust created by the husband, and previously taxed in the wife's
estate, should now be taxed in the husband's estate. In so doing, the
court reasoned that where a grantor creates a trust and retains a seconlary life estate or life income, the transfer is taxable in the grantor's
estate. The court then met the indignant objection of the estate that
the trust had already been taxed as if the wife had been settlor. The
court said that it would not go into the applicability of the Lehman
doctrine when the transfer in trust was plainly includible in the nominal
grantor's estate under the statute, as the husband's trust admittedly was
here. It further stated that the petitioner could not base an argument
of estoppel against the Commissioner upon. a showing of inconsistency
with the assertion of tax liability against another taxpayer.
In what must have been a common reaction to the decision, the
Lawyer's Weekly Report observed,

We think the case is wrong. Although this point is not referred
to in the decision, the Code exempts transfers for a full and
adequate consideration. Since the trust the husband had created
had been sold to the wife for full value (the wife's trust) , it
should be excluded from his gross estate. Indeed, Lehman's
logic rests on reciprocal consideration."'
Had the logic of the Commissioner in assessing the wife's estate rested
on a realistic appraisal of substance over form, instead of on consideration, this righteous complaint could not have been made.
The Weekly raised a further issue:
What about the wife's trust-was it includible in the husband's
estate? This question did not come up, because the husband
had surrendered all his rights in that trust. But this should not
matter: If he had not surrendered, then, under Lehman, the
wife's trust should certainly be in his estate. And if both trusts
wind up in the husband's estate, that is obviously the wrong
result.

This author cannot agree that inclusion of the property of both trusts
in the husband's estate would necessarily be a wrong result, especially
had he not renounced his rights to the trust created by his wife. This
conclusion is based upon the assumption that under section 2013 of the
present statute, 4 8 the husband's estate could receive a credit for part of

the taxes paid by the wife's estate on trust property subsequently in46 12 Lawyer's Weekly Report No. 40 (July 1, 1957).
47 Ibid.
48 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2013.
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cluded in the husband's gross estate. A similar argument was advanced
in the principal case. However, the applicable provision of the 1939
Code, which governed this situation, allowed a deduction only for previously taxed property "received by ... inheritance .... ."' The court
rejected the estate's contention saying that the deceased husband had
not received by inheritance the secondary life estate provided for in his
own trust.
Estate of Florence Moreno59 should be mentioned as the latest
decided case concerning reciprocal trusts. The Tax Court there had little
trouble finding reciprocity and consideration. The case did involve,
however, a more remote power over the property in trust than in most
previous cases. Here, each respective beneficiary had a life estate in the
other's trust contingent on the nominal settlor's death. The court simply
applied the reciprocal trust doctrine and found that each settlor had
retained a right to income from transferred property for a period not
ascertainable without reference to his death. The property therefore
was rendered taxable under section 2036.-'
PROBLEMS IN RELATION

TO THE GIFT TAX

The manner in which consideration enters into the Commissioner's determination of a taxable transfer in the reciprocal trust situation
has been demonstrated. The synthetic nature of the concept of consideration so used becomes apparent when contrasted with the view of the
Commissioner in cases where he attempts to disprove consideration and
thereby subject a transfer to the gift tax. Where the Commissioner has
sought to tax a transfer as a gift, evidence that the trusts were created
simultaneously, in equal principal amounts and contained reciprocal
powers has not been deemed sufficient to overcome the presumption
of absence of consideration. 2 Yet, as has been shown, these same facts
constitute the primary support for determining the presence of consideration in establishing reciprocal trusts.
In a related area, the taxation of reciprocal trusts has created a
definite complication where gift taxes have been paid by the settlors
at the time the trusts were executed. The problem arises under section
2012 which allows a credit for gift taxes paid by a decedent on property
included in his gross estate.53 In the typical reciprocal trust arrangement, each grantor has paid gift taxes on his transfer. Thus the property in both trusts has been fully taxed, but not to the grantors as they
appear after the parties have been crossed in applying the reciprocal
trusts doctrine for estate tax purposes.
It seems entirely unfair that the estate of each grantor in this situation should not receive some credit for gift taxes paid when the trusts
were executed. The cases have not decided the issue, but strictly speakling, under the code, the Commissioner cannot allow any such credit to
a decedent's estate. To subject property to the estate tax the Commissioner must determine that the transfer was for consideration. This
determinatcon eliminates the possibility that a gift was made and ordinarily would render the estate eligible for a refund of gift taxes unnecessarily paid. However, when estate taxes are assessed, the party who
Cir.

49 it. Rev. -ode of 1939, § 812 (c), 53 Stat. 124 (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954. § 2013).
50 E.slate of Florence Moreno, 28 T.C. No. 98 (July 26, 1957), appeal docketed, 8th
51 Int Rev. Code of 1954 § 2036.
52 Comrnissio:ier v. McLean, 127 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1942).
53 Int. Rev. CDde of 1954 § 2012.
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paid

,ilr
o tax ends up as the grantor of the trust created by the other
lie deceased has therefore not paid a gift tax on the same property t,,r which his estate will pay estate tax. The credit granted by section 1'012 is thus lost and a double taxation on each reciprocal transferor and his estate results.
CONCLUSION

The reciprocal trust arrangement is dead as a tax avoidance device.
Indeed, it has been shunned by the tax lawyer since the Lehman case.
Occasionally, especially after a Third Circuit opinion, some see a faint
glimmer of hope for its revival. 55 This is a false hope, however, resulting
solely from difficulties experienced in the various courts with the doctrine of consideration. Unfortunately, this doctrine has too often been
z
allowed to cloud the real issues.
There has been no basic change in the prevailing legislative, executive and judicial attitude that where a taxable power exists in substance
the tax will not be defeated by the use of the trust device. Nor is the
policy to be limited to those with a tax avoidance motive. Proof of
intent to (1o no more than protect the family security will not stay the
hand of the Commissioner where by reciprocal trusts one or more pow
ers made taxable by sections 2036-3856 are vested in each transferee.
Perhaps in the future the situation will be'treated by statute'. Certainly Congress sanctioned the effect of thereciprocal trusts doctr i ne
when it passed the Technical Changes Act of'l949" This act mitigated
the effect of retroactive application of the Lehman doctrine under certain circumstances where the trusts had been created prior to 1940. The
act in no way disapproved the doctrine. In fact, Congress appears to be
ahead of many courts in its recent thinking on this matter, as demonstrated by its illustration in committee reports of taxable reciprocal
trusts." The illustration was based not upon the presence of legal consideration, but upon the retention of effective economic control which
resulted from the reciprocal arrangement.
This should not frighten the attorney away from the legitimate
family trust. It can serve many valuable ends, including tax economy,
and should be employed with this in mind." However, let the attorney
beware of reciprocal trusts, no matter what the intention or motive,
where any type of reversion, life estate or taxable power is vested in the
beneficiaries. Thel rules set out in sections 2036-386" are certain to be
invoked to render thk reciprocal trusts taxable under the estate tax
whenever the presenceof these interests is manifested in any form.
-.
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54 Ibid.
55 Johnson, Rediprocal -rust$-'A
Tax Avoidance
Device With Recuperative
Powers, 36 Neb. L. Rev:-.564 (195Th.
56 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§k-206-38.
57 63 Stat. 893 (1949).
58 HR . Rep. No. 920, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949); Sen. Rep. No. 831, 81st Cong..
1st Sess. 5 (1949).
59 Gray, How to Save Taxes Through Family Trusts, P-H Tax Ideas 16008 (1955). It
is apparent, however, that even though the courts have thus far applied Professor
Scott's principle only to reciprocal trusts in the estate tax field, no reason exists
why the doctrine should not be extended. Consideration, on which the courts base a
taxable situation, may be given to the promisor or to some other person. If X creates
a trust for Y as consideration for Z's creating a trust for X, Scott's principle applies
to make X the settlor of the trust created by Z. Should Z's trust contain taxable
powers, the property ought to be taxed in X's estzte and probably would be, at least

if consideration were evident.
feInt. Rev. Code of 1954,

H§ 2036-38.
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